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Abstract 
This article looks at the current climate finance architecture and its impact on developing countries climate 
change responses. The primary aim is to capture the contradictions that exist in the climate finance architecture 
particularly between those recommended by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and those advanced by developed countries otherwise known as non-UNFCCC climate financing 
mechanisms. The overall observation is that once non-UNFCCC climate financing mechanisms emerged and the 
more they were justified using the UNFCCC, the global response to the climate change problem was fatally 
wounded through a procedural derailment of UNFCCC objectives. This article calls for a review of non-
UNFCCC with the aim of divesting them of the profit factor which in this case is the problematic.  
Keywords: Climate, Finance, Mechanisms, Governance, Privatization, Stalemate.  
 
1.0 Introduction 
Observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and 
rising global average sea level provide evidence of increased global warming which has led to change in global 
climate1. Africa has been singled out as one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate 
variability with projections of increased water stress, adverse food insecurity and malnutrition, and human 
displacement2. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) there is need to reduce and 
limit global temperatures increase to two degrees. The IPCC recommends climate change mitigation as a means 
through which this reduction and limitation can be achieved while also recommending climate change adaptation 
as the means through which we can respond to already existing effects of climate change3. Mitigation and 
adaptation measures require substantial financial investments thus making climate finance central to the 
achievement of the IPCC’s two degrees global temperatures increase recommendation. 
Continuous deadlock has characterized global negotiations on the climate change phenomenon with the main 
subject of discussion in the climate change discussions being climate financing. However, 20 years into climate 
change negotiations, little has been achieved in these negotiations. Indeed, it is be concluded that the only 
achievement so far has been that of establishing profit oriented climate finance mechanisms outside the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This has transformed climate change 
negotiations to become platforms for promoting, defending or camouflaging these profit interests creating 
climate negotiations stalemates and an impairment of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) emissions reductions. The 
question therefore is what makes these interests so powerful that they have strangled progress in climate change 
negotiations and what effects such interests have on the global concern for climate change? 
Scientists have noted that global temperatures should be below 2 degree Celsius threshold above pre-industrial 
levels to avoid the dangerous impact of climate change. Also, global emissions will need to peak by 2020 and 
                                                           
1  Climate Change (2007): the Fourth Assessment synthesis Report of the IPCC; 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (Accessed on 13 November 2013). 
2 ibid 
3 ibid 
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fall 50 percent from 1990 levels by 20501. Identified as a global challenge that requires a global response, 
climate change has remained a dominant subject in global development discussions since the Rio Conference of 
1992. These discussions have led to various instruments such as the UNFCCC in 1994, Kyoto Protocol in 2005 
and the Copenhagen Accord in 2009. None of these instruments documents has, however, successfully addressed 
the subject of climate finance with any desired finality as expected of developed countries within the UNFCCC. 
This paper attempts to explore factors underlying climate financing at the global stage. It aims at putting several 
interventions, transitions and transformations that take place during and after the Conference of Parties (COP) 
into a historical perspective. The paper focuses on how non-UNFCCC climate financing mechanisms have 
interacted with developing countries and the resultant adverse effects they have had on these countries’ climate 
change responses. 
 
1.1 Why Climate Finance? 
Climate finance is aimed at not only having parties to the UNFCCC scale up their efforts towards a clean energy 
development path (mitigation) but also to enable them, where applicable, to adapt to the unavoidable impacts of 
climate change (adaptation). The term, climate finance, was used for the very first time through the UNFCCC in 
1994. However, the design of the UNFCCC’s finance component was informed by previous Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs) especially the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer. The implementation of this Protocol remains a model on how the financial and technological 
challenges that could lead to non-compliance of MEAs by poor countries could be addressed. Earlier, the role of 
finance in the implementation of MEAs had already been acknowledged in Article 7 of the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration. The discussions around climate finance gathered increased momentum following developing 
countries’ demand for increased funding prior and during COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen, Sweden. This 
momentum continued into COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico and later into COP 17 in Durban, South Africa during 
which a decision to establish the formation of the Global Climate Fund was made. It is therefore important for 
one to examine not only the genesis but also the framework, considerations and implications that climate 
financing could have on efforts to contain global climate change.   
 
1.2 Climate Finance Framework 
According to the UNFCCC, developed countries are to provide developing countries new and additional 
financial resources to meet the agreed full costs to develop, implement and communicate various national 
policies2. This position has never been contradicted in any of the COPs meetings. Developed countries are also 
required to cover developing countries’ full incremental costs of implementing mitigation measures3. Developed 
countries are further required to assist the developing countries in meeting costs of adaptation4. Indeed, the 
extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention 
depends on the effective implementation of developed countries’ commitments on financial resources and 
transfer of technology5.  
Initially the financial operating entity of the UNFCCC was the Global Environment Facility (GEF). However, in 
2011, the 17th COP adopted the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as UNFCCC’s new financial operating entity. These 
operating entities receive guidance from the COPs on policy, programme priorities, and eligibility criteria as well 
as on specific issues6. Whereas the Kyoto Protocol affirms UNFCCC’s requirements to have developed countries 
provide climate mitigation and adaptation support to developing countries7, the Protocol also introduces what it 
terms as flexibility mechanisms that Annex1 parties can use to meet their emission limitation commitments and 
to also aid them in providing support required by developing countries.  
However, in 2007, developed countries begun availing climate finance through other sources that are not subject 
to the UNFCCC. These sources had climate finance delivered in the form of loans, non-concessional funds, 
carbon credits and foreign direct investments parallel to GEF and bilateral grants8. A 2009 study established an 
inventory and explanation of Bilateral Financial Institutions (BFIs) finance for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation to inform discussions on financial flows under a future climate change financing architecture9. The 
study illustrated the scale of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and non-ODA financing, the collective 
global share of Bilateral Financial Institutions (BFIs) financing for climate change mitigation and adaptation; 
                                                           
1 Bhowmik, D; (2013) Volume 3, Issue 4, April 2013. 
2 UNFCCC, (1994) Article 4.3 
3Ibid, Article 4.3 
4Ibid, Article 4.4 
5 Ibid, Article 4.7 
6GEF (2010), Table 6 
7 Kyoto Protocol (2005) Article 11.2 
8 Nafo, S. (2012) pg 2 
9 Atteridge, A. et al (2009). 
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and the types of funds and facilities that are used for channelling finance to recipients. 
A 2010 report examined how governments can design a climate financial mechanism in a way that is widely 
perceived as legitimate using three dimensions of legitimacy, which are power, responsibility, and 
accountability1. The report findings indicated that perceptions of the legitimacy of a financial mechanism were 
inherently subjective and that this subjectivity informed preferences expressed by contributor and recipient 
countries. It established that the failure to address the distribution of power, responsibility, and accountability 
may have led to a proliferation of financial mechanisms that are underfunded. It further established that 
perceptions of a financial mechanism’s legitimacy will also depend upon an institution’s performance which is 
its demonstrated capacity to commit funding to investments that reduce greenhouse gas emissions and build 
resilience to climate change. It recommended for significantly redistribute power, responsibility, and 
accountability between traditional contributor and recipient countries for a successful global partnership on 
climate finance. One may, argue that for this power, responsibility and accountability relations conflict to be 
addressed; the underlying factors, in particular, the justification for non-UNFCCC climate financing mechanisms, 
must be brought to the fore.  
 
2.0 Why Should non-UNFCCC Climate Financing be a Concern in Sub-Sahara Africa? 
Concerns that arise from non-UNFCCC climate change financing mechanisms relate to their implication to 
developing countries’ fulfilment of the UNFCCC commitments. This has potential to hurt the entire global 
concerns about climate change. These concerns include the following:- 
2.1 Introduction of Contestation in the Definition of Climate Finance  
The definition of climate finance remains contentious2. However, in 1992, there was consensus among UNFCCC 
UNFCCC member Parties that climate finance refers to the responsibility that developed countries have for 
historical emissions that occurred in their process of becoming rich, a process which is responsible for today’s 
and future’s climate change3. Accordingly therefore, the perception of the UNFCCC is that climate finance for 
adaptation is indeed compensation for damage caused by developed countries in their industrialization process 
and within the polluter pays principle. However, through the emergence of developed countries’ non-UNFCCC 
mechanisms, a resultant developed countries’ perception views adaptation financing as a business opportunity4. 
Whereas the former perception is accused of loading climate financing responsibility on developed countries, the 
later perception is a cause for alarm considering that Africa is not only the continent likely to be most adversely 
impacted by adverse effects of climate change5, she is the least producer of GHGs6. 
2.2 Inadequacy of Climate Finance  
Rarely do any climate change commitments, especially those by non-UNFCCC mechanisms, translate into 
remittances7. According to climate funds update, whereas a total of $1.16 billion had been approved for Sub-
Sahara Africa, only $379 million had been disbursed by end of 20118. In 2011, climate finance was disbursed to 
to thirty one adaptation projects globally, but only five of them were in Sub-Sahara Africa9. Nearly 56% of 
climate finance in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) is directed to mitigation activities with the largest projects 
approved in SSA being the $256 million Olkaria I Unit 4 and 5 Geothermal Power Project in Kenya, through 
Japan’s Fast Start Finance program. It is not explained why no disbursement had ever been effected by the fund 
by 201110.  
Moreover, the reliability and potential of the 2% Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects levy to raise 
funds for the Adaptation Fund as it had been anticipated, has been questioned11. Thus, even if the emergence of 
the non-UNFCCC mechanism was to solve GEF’s failure of not making climate finance adequate, accessible 
and predictable, non-UNFCCC mechanisms have not adequately solved these problems. Indeed, they may have 
as well complicated and rendered UNFCCC objectives completely unattainable. 
2.3 Debt Accumulation 
Generally, private sector’s finance is delivered through instruments like commercial debt, direct foreign 
investment and equity instruments in carbon markets. Essentially, this causes private sector’s climate finance to 
be in the form of loans or non-concessional funding. This does also apply to funding from such sources as 
                                                           
1 Nakhooda. S et al (2011). 
2 Nafo (2012) op cit 
3 UNFCCC, op cit Article 4 
4 Nakhooda et al, 2011, op cit ix. 
5 Hulme, Mike et al (2001): in Climate Research, No. 17, p. 145-168. 
6 The US Energy Information Administration, 2008 website.  
7 Schalatek, L and Bird, N, 2011.  
8 The Climate Funds Update (CFU) data. 
9 Nakhooda et al, 2011, op cit, pg 3 
10 Schalatek. L and Nakhooda, S et al 2011, op cit.pg 2 
11 GenderCC Network, 2007. 
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Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs) and Bilateral Financial Institutions (BFIs). When financing for 
climate change is turned into these forms of financing, it does not only effectively translate a global problem 
which is climate change into a debt burden for victims but leaves the culprit unpunished and deterred from 
creating a similar problem in the future, contrary to the polluter pays principle.  
2.4 Privatization of Public Finance  
There exist two aspects to private sector’s finance. One, the private sector can play the role of an independent 
provider/lender of climate finance to developing countries, MFIs and BFIs. Secondly, the private sector can also 
receive climate finance from MFIs and BFIs respectively1. Obviously, when the private sector provides climate 
finance to developing countries, it does it for profits. However, concern arises when MFIs and BFIs, which are 
essentially public institutions, provide funding to the private sector to invest, most occasionally, in climate 
change mitigation. Whereas the receiving private sector entity make profits from the publicly funded investment, 
that profit becomes privatised  and never finds its way back into public entities. This effectively makes climate 
change the new front for the much criticised public-private partnerships2 that are a pet project of the World Bank 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). If the water sector is anything to go by, then the privatization 
of climate finance becomes even more suspect. One may argue that many developing country governments were 
enticed into by water sector privatization due to the World Bank’s initial claims that private companies would 
actually invest in the rehabilitation and expansion of much-needed water and sanitation infrastructure.  
Indeed considering that privatization entails a transfer of public control and rights to a corporation, privatization 
could in turn result in corruption due to lack of checks for transparency and accountability, transfer of 
accountability to company shareholders and not the general public and an increased public debt. All these could 
spell doom to the realization of IPCC’s 2 degrees global warming threshold targets. To a very large extent, this 
serves as a vindication to developing countries argument for the confinement of climate finance to be public 
finance alone. 
2.5 Country Capacity to Access Climate Finance  
The experience of Mozambique with Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) brings developing countries 
climate finance capacity to focus. Mozambique’s initial process of the PPCR was externally-led. Donor agencies 
did everything from the identification of the opportunity, the setting of the timetable and leading of the activities3. 
activities3. Both the initial scoping mission that was done in July 2009 and the full joint mission that happened 
from November to December 2009 that set in motion the preparation of Mozambique’s proposal were planned, 
designed and led by the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB), who were the lead Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs) for the country’s  PPCR4. Considering that developing countries have had to apply 
for GEF funds through various intermediary agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Bank, rather than presenting proposals directly to 
GEF (GEF Council, 2001), the idea that these countries have the capacity to effectively engage with the more 
complicated non-UNFCCC climate financing mechanisms, such as PPCR, is quite untenable.  
This reality is once again revisited when one examines the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
(FCPF). FCPF has been the main financier of most Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) projects and programmes in 14 African countries5. An external review of Democratic 
Republic of Congo’s (DRC) Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) 6, an instrument of FCPF, raises serious concerns 
concerns regarding the R-PINs consultation process and its ownership. It explicitly points out that the proposal 
has a strong sense of having been the work of outsiders, rather than properly owned by its stakeholders. It further 
points out that the proposal does not contain a discussion of the main issues related to forest law enforcement 
and governance in addition to not having data on indigenous peoples living in Congo’s forests nor their role in 
REDD processes. Despite the many serious shortcomings identified by the external review, the R-PIN for DR 
Congo was approved. 
This display of World Bank’s authority points at developing countries’ incapacity to effectively engage with the 
dominant climate financing actors or agencies. Indeed, a deficit in domestic leadership in climate change 
financing efforts in six African countries has been established7. One may thus conclude that not only has there 
been lack of capacity to access these finances in developing countries, but also that the developed countries and 
MFIs have found it appropriate to stifle the development of these capacities. This makes developing countries 
climate change responses susceptible to external influence, determination and control. This is not sustainable in 
                                                           
1Atteridge, A, et al (2009) op cit, pg 10-15 
2 Masum, S. J.H, (undated). 
3 Chambote. R, and Shankland. A, (2011), pg 11 
4 Ibid pg 17 
5 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPC) (a) 
6 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) (b) 
7 Thornton, N, 2011, pg 24-25. 
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the long run and often leads to frustration in accessing finances to deal with climate change related impacts. 
 
3.0 Factors influencing the current climate finance regime 
Whereas several explanations may be adduced to explain the push towards non-UNFCCC climate finance, the 
following two are the most pertinent to this explanation:-  
3.1 Political Considerations 
Domestic political and policy factors increasingly dominate global climate negotiations1. These factors explain 
the divergence of concerns by both developed and developing countries. One may argue that these concerns have 
continuously influenced perceptions of both developed and developing countries’ in understanding of climate 
finance. For instance, on one hand, the concern for the financial implication of GHGs reduction and market 
competitiveness may be influencing developed countries climate change thinking. On the other hand, enhanced 
commitments for emission limitations by developed countries and ability to cope with the emerging adverse 
effects of climate change may be factors influencing developing countries positions on climate change2. The 
implication of these domestic considerations would imply that global pre-agreement bargaining and post-
agreement implementation are subservient to domestic political and economic considerations. The effects of this 
would be that for developed countries, climate finance is subject to domestic political cost no matter the long 
term future economic benefits of the global agreements. For developing countries, however, climate finance is 
not necessarily subject to climate science, development needs and opportunities, but international political 
economy3. 
3.2 Economic Considerations 
Whereas ability and responsibility on one hand and poverty and effects on the other may have been the ideals 
that guided the formulation of UNFCCC’s climate finance clauses, they long ceased to be. Economic interests 
have taken the centre stage and have seen developed countries pushing to have the World Bank and its network 
of regional banks, manage climate finance. On the other hand, developing countries perceive the involvement of 
the World Bank as undermining the process of negotiations under the UNFCCC4. Considering that the World 
Bank and its regional hubs only offer climate finance in the form of loans and non-concessional funding, it 
would therefore be concluded that the Bank and its financiers perceive climate finance as a lucrative economic 
interest.  
Using Steward’s5 country domestic political and policy analysis, one may argue that for developed countries, the 
the World Bank and the regional banks; climate financing is a voluntarily shared concern by all regardless of 
history and must be especially driven by market or economic interests and at best supplemented by Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA). In itself, this perception negates the thinking of the UNFCCC but is still used 
to justify non-UNFCCC finance mechanisms as complementary mechanisms. For developing countries, climate 
finance can neither be an economic interest nor can it be aid. Rather, it is compensatory, obligatory and rights-
based public funding from developing countries which results from historical pollution facts and within the 
polluter pays and common but differentiated responsibilities and environmental principles6. For developing 
countries, climate finance is primarily about climate change adaptation and private sources of climate finance, 
which would then be about mitigation, are thus just meant to supplement public finance but within strict 
regulations7.  
As currently configured, multilateral and bilateral financial institutions may be having undue influence over 
climate change policy formulation and financial mobilization globally. This configuration is further cemented by 
the involvement of the private sector. As evident in national climate change plans, 8this configuration puts 
climate change mitigation far above adaptation against developing countries’ priorities and development needs. 
Besides, the lacklustre engagement of government with the civil society and the total failure to engage the 
general populace on climate financing denies developing countries governments the much needed impetus to 
push their concerns beyond the developed countries interests at the global negotiations meetings. It would be 
interesting to see if the unveiling of the GCF on December 4th 2013 will change or affirmation the current 
climate finance configuration. 
 
4.0 Conclusion 
This article has highlighted some of the challenges confronting the UNFCCC and the GCF. It has discussed 
                                                           
1 Stewart, R.B, Kingsbury B., and Rudyk B. (eds). 2009, pg 6 
2 Ibid, pg 6-7. 
3 Ibid, pg 6-7. 
4 Third World Network (TWN), 2008 (website) 
5 Stewart (2009) op cit, pg 6 
6 Civil Society Demands on Climate Finance, Busan Civil Society Forum (BCSF), (2011). 
7 Ibid 
8 NEMA, 2005; NEMA, 2006 and NCCAP, 2013. 
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some of the factors that are influencing the metamorphosing of global climate financing regime, how climate 
change is defined and being redefined. It explores the basis for the concerns by developing countries regarding 
the existence of non-UNFCCC climate financing mechanisms. It has been noted that whereas there exists real 
challenges in the mobilization and disbursement of climate finance, these could be less conspicuous. Besides, the 
problem of climate change has been transformed from being a concern about GHGs emissions reduction alone 
into also being a concern about the failure by developed countries to meet their UNFCCC obligation, primarily 
the provision of climate finance to developing countries for both adaptation and mitigation. We have established 
that the unprecedented proliferation of climate change financing mechanisms by developed countries outside the 
UNFCCC in 2007 was informed by business interests. Further, developed countries either deliberately 
misinterpreted or chose to totally ignore international environmental governance principles such as the polluter 
pays principle, the principles of equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, when 
establishing the non-UNFCCC climate financing mechanisms. It is also worth noting that developed countries 
have totally ignored UNFCCC’s requirement to provide new, additional, adequate and predictable climate 
finance to developing countries. Two questions remain unanswered. One, given the growing emphasis on the 
private sector for climate financing, it is increasingly pertinent to ask whether adaptation benefits can be 
commodified, marketised and even traded within current and future global climate governance1? Two, what can 
be done to rescue climate change negotiations from climate finance related economic and political interests by 
developed countries? 
It is apparently clear that climate finance cannot be driven by market forces and that there cannot be a 
justification whatsoever for profits. This implies that non-UNFCCC climate finance mechanisms are a risk that 
must be avoided in the management of global climate change. Moreover, utmost faith, which is the basis for the 
formation of the United Nations Organization, dictates that international environmental governance principles 
are observed and that public goods are protected from private interests. Since it is true that climate change is a 
global problem that requires a global solution, then it provides the right platform on which these principles can 
be affirmed especially by those who claim leadership at the international arena. 
There are four areas that the authors would recommend for future research. These are, one, assessing developed 
countries climate finance ‘readiness’, in this particular case, Kenya’s climate change ‘readiness’. The term, 
‘readiness’ would in this case imply the legal, policy and institutional framework(s); the access to and delivery 
of climate finance; monitoring, evaluation and verification of use and impact of climate finance. Two, assessing 
the effectiveness (comprehensiveness, transparency and accountability) of Kenya’s country systems as the main 
flow channels of climate finance. Three, assessing the potential for the financing model of the Green Climate 
Fund to transform the global climate finance architecture. Four, understanding and unmasking the effects of 
increased private sector participation in financing social development, as currently advanced by the Global North, 
particularly the USA, looking at climate finance as the case of study. 
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